THE CAMPAIGN FOR ATLANTAA QUICK STUDY
In preparation for the campaigns of 1864, President Lincoln wisely appointed General Ulysses S. Grant commander-in-chief of all the Union armies in the field. Grant quickly developed a plan to take maximum advantage of his superior manpower by constantly hammering Confederate armies in Virginia and Georgia and keeping both so fully occupied it would be impossible for either to detach reinforcements to the other. If either of the badly outnumbered Confederate armies could be brought to battle and defeated, both Union armies could then unite and easily dispose of the lone remaining enemy force. In Sherman's words, "Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta nor Savannah was the objective, but the army of Joseph Johnston, go where it might." Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston knew as Sherman advanced into Georgia he must remain near his only supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad to Chattanooga. Since General Johnston faced vastly superior numbers, he wisely fortified strong defensive positions along the railroad, hoping to entice Sherman to either attack him and incur heavy losses, or to expose himself to a counterattack, while attempting to maneuver around him. Johnston would preserve his army by entrenching every step he took, fighting only when attacked, and inviting battle only when conditions were heavily in his favor - refusing to commit to a major battle in which his army might be destroyed. Sherman would counter by holding General Johnston in place with George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, which was almost as large as General Johnston's entire army, and sending flanking armies under John M. Schofield and James B. McPherson right and left in attempts to cut General Johnston's line of supply and retreat, thus forcing him to come out and fight on even terms. But General Johnston repeatedly avoided Sherman's attempts to force the climactic battle, each time slipping away to fortify yet another strong position. The campaign thus became one of continuous maneuvering with Shelby Foote termed The Red Clay Minuet. On June 27th Sherman became so frustrated at his inability to trap and destroy General Johnston's army that he ordered the only all out assault of the campaign at Kennesaw Mountain, but was defeated with heavy losses and would never again attack Johnston in force. But on July 17th, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, either not understanding General Johnston's defensive strategy or not agreeing with it, relieved the General of command and replaced him with General John B. Hood. The campaign of maneuver quickly changed as Hood did just what Sherman had been unable to entice General Johnston to do since May - come out and fifth on even terms. In impetuous and mismanaged attacks at Peachtree Creek, Atlanta and Ezra Church, Hood repeatedly hurled his outnumbered forces against Sherman's advancing columns. In each case the confederates were repulsed with heavy losses, which demoralized and depleted Hood's forces to the point where their ability to successfully defend Atlanta and to cut the city's only remaining supply line, forcing Hood's evacuation of Atlanta on the night of September 1, 1864. With the national election only weeks away, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman for political purposes denied that their original objective had been the destruction of the confederate Army and declared their objective had been Atlanta all along. With the fall of Atlanta, voters in the north became encouraged that the war might yet reach a favorable conclusion and reelected President Lincoln in the November elections - providing him with the confidence and popular support needed to eventually bring the war to a conclusion. VISITING THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN SITES Major Atlanta Campaign civil War sites are The Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, selected by the National Park Service to commemorate the Atlanta Campaign, the Atlanta Cyclorama in Grant Park, which is the largest painting in the world and depicts the July 22 Battle of Atlanta, the Museum at the Atlanta History Center, and the Pickett's Mill Battlefield Historic Site in Paulding county, operated by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. Visiting the smaller, undeveloped sites of the campaign is difficult without an experienced guide. FOR MORE INFORMATION THE CAMPAIGN FOR ATLANTA BY WILLIAM R. SCAIFE is the basic reference on the campaign and winner of the 1995 Richard Barksdale Harwell Award of the Atlanta Civil War Round Table for the best book on a Civil War subject. Available in Leather Limited Edition only, it contains 34 full page definitive maps and a comprehensive Order of Battle for the campaign and may be purchased at the above mentioned Civil War sites, or ordered directly from Civil War Publications, 621 Old Allatoona Road, Cartersville, Ga. 30121 for $40.00, postage included. Excellent book stores at the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park and the Atlanta Cyclorama carry a variety of soldiers diaries, reminiscences and general information pertaining to the campaign. Emory University offers a year around course entitled Red Clay Minuet: The Campaign for Atlanta in its Evening at Emory program. Call 404 874-0999 for information.
|
The Campaign
for Atlanta was one of the most unique and frequently misinterpreted
campaigns of military history, and a little back ground is essential
to place it in proper perspective. Union victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg
and Chattanooga in 1863 had changed the momentum of the Civil War and
left the confederates with little hope of overcoming the superior manpower
and resources of their northern opponents. But in the Spring of 1864,
there was still a chance they might retain their independence through
a negotiated peace. The people of the North were tired of the seemingly
endless struggle, with its mounting casualties and heavy drain on the
national treasury. General George B. McClellan, whom Lincoln had sacked
earlier in the war, had announced his intention to oppose President
Lincoln in the November elections, running on a peace ticket. Should
he defeat Lincoln, a peace might be negotiated which would allow the
Confederacy to exist as an independent nation. The Confederates therefore
did not have to defeat their opponents, but had merely to avoid the
destruction of their armies in the field and to drag out the costly
and unpopular war until election time.